Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Setting the scene
- 2 Reasons for welfare
- 3 Alternative institutional designs
- 4 National embodiments
- 5 Background expectations
- 6 Testing the theories with panels
- Part II One standard of success: external moral criteria
- Part III Another standard of success: internal institutional criteria
- Appendix tables
- References
- Index
2 - Reasons for welfare
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Setting the scene
- 2 Reasons for welfare
- 3 Alternative institutional designs
- 4 National embodiments
- 5 Background expectations
- 6 Testing the theories with panels
- Part II One standard of success: external moral criteria
- Part III Another standard of success: internal institutional criteria
- Appendix tables
- References
- Index
Summary
There are many reasons for states to concern themselves with the welfare – the well-being – of their citizens. In terms of pragmatic politics, governments wanting to stay in office must satisfy the desires of their electors. Providing people with ‘bread and circuses’ is a time-honoured formula for securing social peace. Economically, improving human capital is a good productive investment, and giving poor people more purchasing power stimulates the demand side of the economy. Sociologically and psychologically, attending to social welfare is a sign that ‘we care’, unifying the nation and stirring people to greater sacrifices when required.
None of those, however, represent the sorts of ‘reasons for welfare’ with which we will be concerned in this chapter. The reasons which concern us here pertain not to causes and pragmatic motives but, rather, to more high-minded moral reasons. What we will be looking for here are good reasons, from a moral point of view, for attending to the welfare of our fellow citizens. Empirical matters – the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ – will be addressed in later chapters. Our stance in the present chapter is insistently normative rather than empirical, evaluative rather than explanatory.
It would nonetheless be wrong to draw an overly sharp distinction between the two sets of concerns. Moral norms matter, socially and politically (and hence ultimately morally as well), only insofar as people can actually be motivated to act upon them (Goodin 1993).
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- Chapter
- Information
- The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism , pp. 21 - 36Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1999
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