Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Readings in the economics of contract law
- Part I Some preliminaries
- Part II Contract law and the least cost avoider
- Part III The expectation interest, the reliance interest, and consequential damages
- Part IV The lost-volume seller puzzle
- Part V Specific performance and the cost of completion
- Part VI Power, governance, and the penalty clause puzzle
- Part VII Standard forms and warranties
- Part VIII Duress, preexisting duty, and good faith modification
- 8.1 Duress by economic pressure, I
- 8.2 Gratuitous promises in economics and law
- 8.3 The mitigation principle: toward a general theory of contractual obligation (2)
- 8.4 The law of contract modifications: the uncertain quest for a benchmark of enforceability
- Questions and notes on duress
- Part IX Impossibility, related doctrines, and price adjustment
- Questions and notes on impossibility and price adjustment
- References
- Index of cases
- Author index
- Subject index
Questions and notes on duress
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Readings in the economics of contract law
- Part I Some preliminaries
- Part II Contract law and the least cost avoider
- Part III The expectation interest, the reliance interest, and consequential damages
- Part IV The lost-volume seller puzzle
- Part V Specific performance and the cost of completion
- Part VI Power, governance, and the penalty clause puzzle
- Part VII Standard forms and warranties
- Part VIII Duress, preexisting duty, and good faith modification
- 8.1 Duress by economic pressure, I
- 8.2 Gratuitous promises in economics and law
- 8.3 The mitigation principle: toward a general theory of contractual obligation (2)
- 8.4 The law of contract modifications: the uncertain quest for a benchmark of enforceability
- Questions and notes on duress
- Part IX Impossibility, related doctrines, and price adjustment
- Questions and notes on impossibility and price adjustment
- References
- Index of cases
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
1. Goebel v. Linn is discussed in three of the selections. Which do you find most persuasive?
1.1 Suppose that Goebel accepted the modified contract until the end of the season. Instead of defaulting on the note, Goebel then sued the ice company for damages for breach of contract and argued that the second contract was simply the “cover” contract. Should it be able to recover the difference between the original contract price ($2.00) and the modified contract price ($3.50)? See Endiss v. Belle Isle Ice Co.
1.2 The fact that the size of the ice crop would depend upon the weather is obvious and one would expect that ice contracts would reflect this. The twenty-five cent premium in the event of a small ice crop in Goebel's contract is one way to deal with this contingency. A second device would be to include a prorationing arrangement. Such a clause was used by at least one other seller of ice in that era. See Kemp v. The Knickerbocker Ice Co.
1.3 Suppose that Goebel's contract did call for prorationing and that some buyers used their quotas to resell to those who were desperate for ice at prices in the $10- to $15-per-ton range.
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- Readings in the Economics of Contract Law , pp. 208 - 210Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1982