Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text
- Fichte Studies
- Group I 1–210 (fall to early winter, 1795)
- Group II 211–287 (winter, 1795 to February, 1796)
- Group III 288–372 (February–March, 1796)
- Group IV 373–552 (March to early summer, 1796)
- Group V 553–568 (summer, 1796)
- Group VI 569–667 (summer to fall, 1796)
- Index
- Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy
Group III - 288–372 (February–March, 1796)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text
- Fichte Studies
- Group I 1–210 (fall to early winter, 1795)
- Group II 211–287 (winter, 1795 to February, 1796)
- Group III 288–372 (February–March, 1796)
- Group IV 373–552 (March to early summer, 1796)
- Group V 553–568 (summer, 1796)
- Group VI 569–667 (summer to fall, 1796)
- Index
- Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy
Summary
Principal Rule
288. Everything, irrespective of whether we reflect upon or sense it, is an object and so stands under the laws of the object. The opposite itself is an object insofar as we reflect upon it.
If the object in general is an object of reflection, then it also stands under its [the object's] laws. It is determined by the opposite. If reflection turns from the object in general to the object's opposite, then it only rotates, it has again one object before it, but a particular one – and so we discover that the particular object was the objective opposite of the object in general.
289. What holds for the object in general, holds for every object.
Opposing the object in general there is an opposite, which we became acquainted with as the particular object. [See #284–285.]
But how can the particular object be presupposed by the object in general, but of course not as object – the object in general was the particular object. The aforementioned particular object must therefore not have become a kind of particular object, but rather nothing other than the particular, or opposite in general.
What holds of the opposite in general, holds also of every opposite.
/Intuition relates to the object from the opposite./ Reflection [relates] from the object back to the opposite. Reflection is returning intuition. Feeling refers from [the] object to [its] opposite and is called returning sensation./
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Novalis: Fichte Studies , pp. 103 - 129Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003