Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- List of maps
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- List of the principal dramatis personae
- Europe, 1914
- The Balkans, 1914
- Introduction
- 1 Prelude: the road to Sarajevo
- 2 Sarajevo and its echoes: 28 June to 5 July
- 3 The triumph of tactics over strategy: 6 to 21 July
- 4 Localizing the crisis: 19 to 23 July
- 5 The ultimatum: 23 to 26 July
- 6 Localizing the war: 26 to 28 July
- 7 Escalation: 29 July to 4 August
- Conclusion
- Index
- Plate section
- References
3 - The triumph of tactics over strategy: 6 to 21 July
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2014
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- List of maps
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- List of the principal dramatis personae
- Europe, 1914
- The Balkans, 1914
- Introduction
- 1 Prelude: the road to Sarajevo
- 2 Sarajevo and its echoes: 28 June to 5 July
- 3 The triumph of tactics over strategy: 6 to 21 July
- 4 Localizing the crisis: 19 to 23 July
- 5 The ultimatum: 23 to 26 July
- 6 Localizing the war: 26 to 28 July
- 7 Escalation: 29 July to 4 August
- Conclusion
- Index
- Plate section
- References
Summary
There, in Kakania, this misunderstood and since disappeared state, yet in so many ways exemplary without being so recognized, there was also tempo, just not too much tempo.
ROBERT MUSILThe talks at Potsdam and Berlin on 5 and 6 July marked an important turning point during the events of the summer of 1914. In securing the ‘blank cheque’, the suave hawk Hoyos and the faux ‘gypsy’ ambassador Szögyény had achieved a remarkable diplomatic triumph, albeit one for entirely undiplomatic ends and one that was to remain well-concealed until war was imminent. The promise of unconditional German support gave the Ballhausplatz the assurance it had sought before any firm action against Serbia could be contemplated. For Berchtold the ‘blank cheque’ opened the road towards a swift and decisive move against the intractable southern neighbour. Its speed and decisiveness, and the specific circumstances of the Sarajevo regicide, created the chance of deterring intervention by the other Powers. Above all it offered the hope of circumscribing Russia’s room for interference, as German support had done in the Bosnian annexation crisis in 1908–9. Berlin’s support thus ought to ensure that the contemplated move against Serbia would not escalate into a wider conflict. If it did, then Germany would provide cover along the Monarchy’s long and vulnerable Galician frontier in the north. As was seen earlier, the notion of ‘settling accounts’ with Serbia set the tone of the discussions at Vienna in the days immediately after Sarajevo. The ‘blank cheque’ reinforced the belligerent attitude of senior Habsburg officials. It guaranteed that Austria-Hungary’s final reckoning with Serbia would be a military one. A diplomatic solution was now the least favoured option for Vienna.
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- Information
- July CrisisThe World's Descent into War, Summer 1914, pp. 102 - 172Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014