Suharto' increasing satisfaction through the 1980s with his ideological and economic handiwork coincided with the waning influence of the old political brokers within the New Order polity. As Elson observed (2001, p. 244): “Ali Murtopo' star, for so long in the ascendant, had begun to wane following his heart attack in 1978 (he died in May 1984), while Sudjono Humardani' influence faded in the early 1980s with the arrival of more professional and technically skilled bureaucrats.”

This brought a new political alignment within the inner circle of Suharto' patronage structure. The Golkar leadership during Sudharmono' period (1983–88) heralded the diminishing influence of Murtopo' group, as Sudharmono preferred to accommodate Islamic activists. The appointment of Murtopo' intelligence protégé, L.B. Murdani, as the military commander in March 1983 temporarily sustained the influence of the non-Muslim lobby. The dismissal of Murdani as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in 1988, however, marked the turning point in Suharto' attitudinal and strategic relations with the military elites. The president began to welcome the promotion of Islamic-friendly-military officers sometimes referred to as the “green army”.

Friendly overtures by Muslim organizations towards the state orthodoxy encouraged the regime to accommodate Muslim representatives in the leadership of the New Order polity and bureaucracy. During the 1983–88 period, some representatives of the Muslim intelligentsia began to play important roles on Golkar' central executive board (DPP-Golkar). This group of Muslim intelligentsia was comprised of Akbar Tanjung (as the vice secretary-general), K.H. Tarmudji, Ibrahim Hasan, Anang Adenansi, and Qudratullah (DPP-Golkar 1994, pp. 165–68). About the same time, Muslim intellectuals in the government bureaucracy such as Mar'ie Muhammad, Bedu Amang, Muslimin Nasution, Sajuti Hasibuan and some others were appointed to upper echelon positions.