Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Human abilities in theoretical cultures
- 1 The abilities of mankind: A revaluation
- 2 A triarchic view of intelligence in cross-cultural perspective
- 3 The biological basis of intelligence
- 4 Speed of information processing and population differences
- 5 The factor model as a theoretical basis for individual differences
- 6 The meaning of item bias in ability tests
- Part II Cultural responses to ability measurement
- Part III Cultural limits upon human assessment
- Author index
- Subject index
3 - The biological basis of intelligence
from Part I - Human abilities in theoretical cultures
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Human abilities in theoretical cultures
- 1 The abilities of mankind: A revaluation
- 2 A triarchic view of intelligence in cross-cultural perspective
- 3 The biological basis of intelligence
- 4 Speed of information processing and population differences
- 5 The factor model as a theoretical basis for individual differences
- 6 The meaning of item bias in ability tests
- Part II Cultural responses to ability measurement
- Part III Cultural limits upon human assessment
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
The difficulties attending cross-cultural comparisons in intelligence are well known, and are emphasised throughout this book. In large part, these differences derive from a choice between two different paradigms of intelligence, namely those of Sir Francis Galton and those of Alfred Binet, a choice made early in the history of intelligence testing on the basis of inadequate analysis and empirical study, and one giving rise to many of the difficulties encountered in this field. This fateful choice preferred the approach of Binet to that of Galton, and a brief discussion of these two paradigms may provide a useful introduction to this chapter's topic.
The differences between the approaches of Binet and Galton are manifold, but centre in the main around three major points. The first concerns the concept of intelligence itself. For Galton, intelligence was a unitary ability, underlying all intellectual cognitive tasks, differences in which accounted for the differential abilities of people to solve problems, learn complex material, and carry out many different cognitive tasks of everyday life. Binet, on the other hand, believed in the existence of a large number of separate abilities, including some, such as suggestibility, which we would not normally count as part of intelligence. According to him, intelligence would just be the average for a given person of all these independent and separate abilities, and hence not a unitary factor at all. This debate has continued over the years, with psychologists like Spearman, Burt, and Vernon postulating the existence of a general factor of intelligence, while others, such as Guilford (Guilford & Hoepfner, 1971), postulate a large number of independent abilities, reaching, to date, the astonishing sum of 120 in the case of Guilford.
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- Human Abilities in Cultural Context , pp. 86 - 104Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1988
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