Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps and Tables
- Introduction
- 1 Bismarck and Empire: 1885–1888. Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall Islands and Nauru
- 2 The Acquisition of Kiautschou: 1897
- 3 China 1897–1914: Colonial Development and Political Turbulence
- 4 Tectonic Shift 1: 1898–1899. Spain and the USA, Germany, Micronesia and Samoa
- 5 Tectonic Shift 2: 1902–1914. Japan and Russia, Britain and Dominion Defence, the United States
- 6 War. August 1914
- 7 Naval Plans and Operations 1897–1914
- 8 Kiautschou: Naval and Military Operations 22 August–28 September 1914
- 9 Tsingtau: Naval and Military Operations 28 September–7 November 1914
- 10 Aftermath
- Notes to the Text
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - War. August 1914
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps and Tables
- Introduction
- 1 Bismarck and Empire: 1885–1888. Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall Islands and Nauru
- 2 The Acquisition of Kiautschou: 1897
- 3 China 1897–1914: Colonial Development and Political Turbulence
- 4 Tectonic Shift 1: 1898–1899. Spain and the USA, Germany, Micronesia and Samoa
- 5 Tectonic Shift 2: 1902–1914. Japan and Russia, Britain and Dominion Defence, the United States
- 6 War. August 1914
- 7 Naval Plans and Operations 1897–1914
- 8 Kiautschou: Naval and Military Operations 22 August–28 September 1914
- 9 Tsingtau: Naval and Military Operations 28 September–7 November 1914
- 10 Aftermath
- Notes to the Text
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The causes of The Great War, as it was generally known in Britain and France until superseded by a later and a good deal greater conflict, are still the subject of much debate and inquiry, with several schools of thought having emerged. It is not proposed to enter into this particular thicket here, but it can hardly be controversial to state that the origins of the conflict lay in Europe. The ostensible spark that set it off being, as Bismarck is supposed to have predicted, ‘some damned silly thing in the Balkans’. Whether the subsequent events were due to misjudgements and gambles, or through hardheaded calculation, is arguable. There were though several milestones along the road, if I may be forgiven for putting it so, and it as intended to highlight at least some of these.
As has already been argued, avoiding situations, whether ‘damned silly’, or geographically based, or neither, whereby Germany would get into a serious conflict, potential or actual, with the other European Great Powers had been the leitmotif of Bismarck's Chancellorship after 1871. Neither Caprivi nor Hohenlohe were desirous of foreign confrontation, though neither was wholly in control of foreign policy. Bülow, who saw himself as the ‘executive tool’ or ‘political Chief of Staff’ to the Kaiser's personal rule, wanted to avoid this kind of dichotomy at the top of government.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Germany's Asia-Pacific EmpireColonialism and Naval Policy, 1885–1914, pp. 85 - 116Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2009