Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations for Rawls’s texts
- Introduction
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- 153 Paternalism
- 154 Peoples
- 155 Perfectionism
- 156 Plan of life
- 157 Pogge, Thomas
- 158 Political conception of justice
- 159 Political liberalism, justice as fairness as
- 160 Political liberalisms, family of
- 161 Political obligation
- 162 Political virtues
- 163 Practical reason
- 164 Precepts of justice
- 165 Primary goods, social
- 166 The priority of the right over the good
- 167 Procedural justice
- 168 Promising
- 169 Property-owning democracy
- 170 Public choice theory
- 171 Public political culture
- 172 Public reason
- 173 Publicity
- R
- S
- T
- U
- W
- Bibliography
- Index
154 - Peoples
from P
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations for Rawls’s texts
- Introduction
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- 153 Paternalism
- 154 Peoples
- 155 Perfectionism
- 156 Plan of life
- 157 Pogge, Thomas
- 158 Political conception of justice
- 159 Political liberalism, justice as fairness as
- 160 Political liberalisms, family of
- 161 Political obligation
- 162 Political virtues
- 163 Practical reason
- 164 Precepts of justice
- 165 Primary goods, social
- 166 The priority of the right over the good
- 167 Procedural justice
- 168 Promising
- 169 Property-owning democracy
- 170 Public choice theory
- 171 Public political culture
- 172 Public reason
- 173 Publicity
- R
- S
- T
- U
- W
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Any theory of international justice must include an account of the agents between whom duties of justice apply. In Rawls’s LP these agents are “peoples.” The term is somewhat obscure. While Rawls gives no general definition, certain key features are evident: a people is an independent, territorially based, political community united by “common sympathies” (LP 23) and a shared sense of justice. Though the emphasis on common sympathies, formed partly by cultural, historical, and linguistic ties, might suggest that peoples are akin to nations or ethnic groups, Rawls clearly construes peoples as essentially politically organized in a way that these other collectivities are not. However, at the same time, he carefully distinguishes peoples from states, to avoid implying two features traditionally associated with the latter in international law: the right to wage war for national gain and the right to unlimited discretion affairs (LP 25). Rawls also emphasizes that, unlike states as traditionally conceived, peoples are capable of having a moral character: ideally, they are concerned to cooperate on fair, mutually respectful terms with other peoples (LP 35).
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- Information
- The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon , pp. 599 - 601Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014
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